ABSTRACT. -The usual models of international trade focus attention on the optimality of free trade versus any type of barrier. The present paper considers in addition a criterion of "acceptability": the choice of a trade pattern must be accepted by a majority of the population concerned, since they are also interested in preserving different elements of social protection such as a minimal wage or unemployment benefits.
Introduction
Traditional models of international trade focus attention on the flows of goods and services resulting from the contact between economies with different characteristics. The distortion in the flows which may result from different barriers (custom duties, levies, quotas...) are studied. The general conclusion favours free trade either as an optimal organization or, at least, as an optimal policy (see KRUGMAN [1993] ).
Such an approach however completely leaves aside the question of the "acceptability" of free trade in terms of majority support. Especially, for countries where social rigidities such as a minimal wage prevail, free trade may generate unemployment and be rejected on this basis. A more complex situation is when a high level of social protection, such as an unemployment benefit, induces a redistribution which negatively affects the potential winners of free trade. Too often, the classical litterature ignores the problem of the redistributions of income induced by trade (see McCULLOCH [1993] ).
We have already shown (in FUCHS [1994] ) examples where situations such as those above lead a majority to prefer autarky to free trade. The framework was a simple two countries, two goods, two factors model, the factors being two types of labour, unskilled and skilled. The present paper extends the previous analysis in three respects:
-it deals with a continuum of situations between autarky and free trade, each defined by a level of authorized imports, equilibria (with rationing) in the markets of the goods, different levels of unemployment;
-it analyses the majority positions when the level of is increased, possibly through a dynamic process lifting barriers (blocking majorities then may appear);
-it considers last a more complex dynamic process including training that transforms unskilled into skilled labour and shows that, after some time, free trade will always obtain majority support.
More precisely, Section 2 introduces the details of the model. Section 3 defines an equilibrium concept which can take several forms according to the assumptions made on the capacities of training. Section 4 compares, from the point of view of majority voting, the different situations which can be considered between autarky and free trade, corresponding to different levels of quotas and minimal social protection. Section 5 presents the same analysis when unemployment benefits exist. Section 6 introduces a training procedure allowing initially unskilled workers to have access to skilled positions and the main results of the paper, that depend on the characteristics of the economy and different choices of policy, are presented. Last, Section 7 presents a global discussion and comment of all results and argues that they support the idea of "organized" international trade.
The Model
The basic model used here considers exchanges between two zones, North and South, both consuming and producing a good number one, named "textile" just for the image, while a good number two, more sophisticated, is consumed in the two zones but only produced in the North.
Goods 1 and 2 are produced from labour only, in constant returns to scale technologies, with coefficients and for good 1 in and respectively and coefficient for good 2. An essential feature of the model is then the existence of two types of labour: unskilled labour, available in integer quantities and in and respectively, for the production of textile; and skilled labour, available in only in quantity , for the production of good 2. Skilled labour implies a higher level of education or training than unskilled labour so that logically, ( ) being the corresponding wages in , we shall suppose that (1) a characteristic which implies, as we shall see later on, that unskilled workers try to become skilled. Now being the wage paid to the unskilled in (expressed in the same numeraire as in ) we also supose that (2) just because the unskilled labour force is plentiful in and supposed not to be mobile.
Production of goods 1 and 2 will then take place if their local prices are related to wages through:
We shall suppose that even if (a higher productivity of unskilled labour in than in ) the gap between and in (2) is such that still
Last, we shall suppose that workers of are endowed with identical utility functions of the form:
where is the individual consumption of good and . Workers are in fact wage earners trying to sell a unit of labour, i.e. they look for DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY OF FREE TRADE the maximal level of under a budget constraint where the only income is wage and, possibly, positive or negative transfer revenues.
The situation in , where a high level of unemployment and a large informal sector are supposed to exist, will not be described in detail. It will only be supposed that the income can earn by possibly selling textile to is totally used to buy good 2 from . To introduce time considerations and a continuum of situations between autarky and free trade, we shall use as the main policy tool at the disposal of the definition of quotas 1 : the relations between and will be characterized by the volume of textile authorized to be introduced into at price . Because of its lower price, consumers of will then try to buy imported textile before "local" textile. For small values of (the word "small" will receive a precise definition later on) demand for imported textile will be higher than supply so that we have to consider a "rationing scheme" (see BENASSY [1982] ). For simplicity we shall consider a scheme proportional to demands, i.e. we suppose that, given , a worker of type or 2 according to whether he is unskilled or skilled) can buy a quantity of textile at price with
where is the solution of the program:
under which gives
For the to define a rationing scheme we then must impose in addition:
(ii) where is the number of active workers of type in a situation with a given (unemployed wage earners can buy nothing at this stage; we shall in what follows forget about the integer character of the and consider them as percentages of the ).
Given (i) and (ii) one then gets easily (7) 1. Quotas may also be seen however as the result of a policy of voluntary export restriction by .
with (8) where is nothing but the total wages, and thus income, in given : the share of that a worker of type can buy is just his share in total income.
We then have all necessary elements to introduce a concept of equilibrium.
Definition of q-Equilibria
Let us first consider the behaviour of a worker of type , supposing observed wages and thus, from (3), prices are those considered in Introduction. He will choose a consumption bundle which maximizes given the facts that: -he can buy textile at price , up to the quantity , -he can go on buying textile at price beyond . Clearly then, according to the level of , there will be different situations. Let be the quantity, from (6) and (7) independant of , defined by
Then, if all workers can buy all the textile they wish at price , thus
and we are in a pure free trade situation. Next, if , a worker of type will solve the program:
(note that, from (9), ). Considering, to begin, only the first constrainst and defining , calculation then gives
The sum of the values of these two consumptions, at price and respectively, is easily seen to be , the last term of the sum representing the extra purchasing power resulting for from the access to at price . Now considering in addition the constraint i.e.
we get from (12) where (13) Let then be the value of , independant of , defined by:
Clearly (because . Then, if , the demand of a worker of type is indeed given by (12). If we have, using to calculate the budget constraint of (11): (15) Having specified the behaviours of consumers and knowing those of producers we can then introduce DEFINITION 1: Wages and and the quota with define a -equilibrium if, given these data -consumption of textile in equals production in plus the import , -production of good 2 in matches consumption of plus the demand that addresses to using its exports receipts of textile to buy good 2.
Precisely that means: (17) or that they imply and undetermined (the equivalence of both equations (16) just reflects the facts that total wages sum up to the value of total production while external trade between and is balanced). Of course, the active population cannot be greater than the total population.
Note that, from (17), i.e. the autarkic situation appears to be compatible with full employment iff: (18) a condition (already used in [3] ) that we shall suppose to be fulfilled in what follows and which fixes the ratio . This means that, finally, our only exogenous data are and . Now, among the family of -equilibria we are going to specify two limit elements of particular interest.
DEFINITION 2: We call -equilibrium with perfect mobility a pair satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1 and, in addition, the equality (19) To comment this definition, let us first solve (17) and (19) in and . There is a unique solution which is, with the use of (18): (20) One can then interpret these as follows: a level of imports of textile in creates a level of unemployment among unskilled workers but, simultaneously, creates new jobs in the production of good 2, which is increased due to the purchases of . This is possible only if unskilled workers can be transformed instantaneously in skilled workers, hence our reference to perfect mobility. Of course (20) is only valid for , between and one has and .
DEFINITION 3: We call -equilibrium with perfect rigidity a pair ( ) satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1 and, in addition, . Solving (17) in then immediately gives, with the use of (18) again:
The interpretation now can read as follows: a level of imports of textile in creates a level of unemployment among unskilled workers; the constancy of the number of skilled workers means that, this time, there is no mobility between unskilled and skilled manpower, hence the notion DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY OF FREE TRADE of perfect rigidity. Again (21) is only valid for : between and one has , . Clearly, definitions 2 and 3 have to be interpreted as describing limit situations where the speed of introduction of the quota is either much slower than the speed of training of unskilled workers (case of perfect mobility) or much higher than this speed of training (case of perfect rigidity). After section III and IV, section V will deal with an other type of situation where this relative speed is neither 0 nor . Now equations (20) and (21) easily allow to calculate the associated functions and the values and . One gets for instance: -For -equilibrium with perfect mobility: (22) -For -equilibrium with perfect rigidity: (23) Two comments then. First, one can check that for both equilibria, which is not a surprise: indeed, from its definition, is the level of for which all demands for "local" textile vanish; this means that all unskilled workers are unemployed then. Next, for both equilibria also, is equal to the total demand for imported textile of the skilled wokers (in number either or ).
Acceptability with Minimal Social Protection
We shall now introduce the first social and political assumptions which will allow us to begin to compare, from the point of view of majority voting, the different situations that may occur for different values of between autarky and free trade.
First, it is clear that the definition we gave of -equilibria implies the implicit assumption that, however high is the volume of , the wage level of unskilled workers (and so thus ) remains rigid: the downward pressure on wages which results from competition of with has no consequence. We shall justify this fact as an explicit choice of policy by the authorities of namely: Assumption 1 (minimal wage) Wage is a minimal wage level in . If one considers that this minimal wage has to be a real wage, i.e. allows to buy a definite basket of goods, then rigidity of implies rigidity of : in the model, adjustment to go to -equilibria is only the result of unemployment.
Then, we shall introduce a simple democratic rule which will be the base for the choice by the authorities of of a definite level of . Let be the situation, described in the previous section, corresponding to a -equilibrium with perfect mobility or rigidity (. being then replaced by or ). is the autarkic situation, with the free trade situation. We define:
Assumption 2 (democratic rule) The auhorities of will choose a situation rather than a situation ( and being two levels of quota between 0 and ) if and only if the number of workers whose utility level is strictly higher in than in is strictly greater than the number of workers whose utility level is strictly lower.
We shall note the aggregate preference defined above through:
Now it is worth paying some attention to this preference in terms of information and vote.
One can first develop a purely static interpretation where, given and , all the elements characterizing situations and (i.e. beyond wages and , and are exactly known. A first case then is when they are known by the authorities who, if they also know the utility function , can directly aggregate individual preferences and take the decision. In a second case, when the authorities ignore , they will send their information to the agents and ask for a vote. Of course, in case of perfect information of the agents, the authorities can directly organize the vote. It has to be noted though, that in the last two cases where a vote is actually organized, a rule has to exist to fix who explicitely among the initially unskilled workers will get skilled or unemployed (for instance the rule can be: are trained first those who have the longest experience, or are fired first those who have been hired last).
One can also develop a dynamical interpretation, where the aggregate preference is used to defined a succession of acceptable situations with . At time it is then logical to suppose that all the elements of are known by everyone (it is mere observation) while the information about falls into one of the three cases discussed above. We are then in position to state the following first results: PROPOSITION 2: Let be such that . Then:
-in case of perfect mobility of labour or in case of perfect rigidity of labour if , one has ; -in case of perfect rigidity of labour if there exists such that:
Proof: Let us look at the utility level of a worker of type . Let us define:
First for (i.e. in case of unemployment) we have from (5) and (6) (this is the only situation where ). Next for a given , the utility level of a skilled worker is always higher than the utility level of an unskilled one (this can be seen directly looking at (6), (12) and (15)).
Then, for and , the are strictly increasing functions of and so is also (see Annex 1).
For the situation is more subtle. However, without surprise because a greater means a larger choice of opportunities for workers, one can check (see Annex 1 again) that still, in the range above, (obviously, for remains constant). Thus, all individual utility levels increase with between 0 and (either from the only increase in or from the increase in income for those who, from (20), become skilled workers) except for the unskilled workers who become unemployed. This proves the first indent of Proposition 2, unemployed workers either not existing or being for any value of a minority. Now in case of perfect rigidity with , the number of unemployed people for a given is, using (21):
Then clearly is equivalent to the fact that the number of active workers is strictly greater or smaller than the number of unemployed.
This implies first that, for , . For , the condition is equivalent to or Using (18) and (23), this is equivalent to: (24) which achieves the proof.
Remark 1: Obviously from the proof, in case of perfect mobility or perfect rigidity with , so that Proposition 2 extends the results of FUCHS [1994] which only compared autarky and free trade.
Remark 2: The case of perfect rigidity with leads to an amusing extension of the Condorcet paradox since, with , one can have simultaneously:
Remark 3: In all cases the model in its present form can already be used to build interesting dynamic policies defined through a succession of quota. For instance the authorities can propose an arbitrary , organize a vote to know whether and then define a sequence of either increasing until the free trade situation, or moving towards which is the maximal opening accepted by majority voting. The paradox above then just reflects the myopic behaviour of the workers, who do not consider the future since they cannot transfer value from one period to another.
Rather than considering such dynamics though, we shall go further in the introduction of social assumptions so as to deal with more realistic and interesting situations.
Acceptability with High Social Protection
We shall now add two social assumptions: Assumption 3 (unemployment benefit) Any unemployed person of receives an unemployment benefit equal to the fraction of the minimal wage . Assumption 4 (solidarity tax) The financing of the unemployment benefit is obtained through a solidarity tax proportional to the income of active workers.
Assumptions 3 and 4 of course only make sense for -equilibria with perfect rigidity. We shall thus consequently forget, in what follows, about the superscript .
Compared with the previous section, the distribution of income, given , then becomes: -the resources of the unemployed unskilled workers change from 0 to (25) which means that the total amont of solidarity tax is is the total wages, and thus income, in so that:
-the ressources of the active skilled workers change from to (29) Of course the new income distribution keeps the same sum as the initial one. For this redistribution to make full sense however, it has to be proven that it has no effect on the employment distribution. This is the consequence of the following result:
LEMMA 1: Total demands for goods 1 and 2, and thus levels of employment, are not affected by income redistribution.
Proof: It has to be noted first that one can extend in an obvious manner the rationing scheme considered in (7) to situations where there are more than two levels of income (which is the case of the situation just above). Indeed, one can keep the same function and just define for Then the demand functions associated with the three situations arising from the existence of an unemployment benefit keep the same analytical form as given in (10), (12) or (15). This means, using (6), that they satisfy: Then, obviously, total demands for goods 1 and 2 remain constant because using identity above: so that equation (16) defining -equilibria and the levels of unemployment is not affected.
It is worth to be noted that lemma 1 does not depend on the specific form of the utility function that we have introduced in (5) but only relies on the fact that demand functions deriving from are homogeneous of degree 1 in income.
We can then prove the following central proposition: Proof: The assumption has the nice effect that the choice of a skilled worker is the choice of the whole community . As can be read from the Proposition though, it does not mean that things are simple. Let us examine successively the assertions above.
From the discussion in the first part of Annex 1, it can first be seen that for three types of situations may occur according to the way the utility of a skilled worker:
behaves as a function of or . These three situations are drawn in figure 1, 2 and 3 and arise from the fact that as a function of has, between 0 and , a graph which is a piece of parabola with a maximum in which can be greater than (Figure 1 ), smaller than 0 (Figure 2 ) or between 0 and (Figure 3 ). The economic intuition behind these situations is whether the gain in due to the positive price effect (access to a larger amount of textile at low price) is or not greater than the loss due to the negative income effect (obviously, from (29), decreases when increases). Then the use of (A5) proves the first three assertions of Proposition 3 (the values of or can be obtained from (A3) and (A4)).
Last, the discussion of the second part of Annex 1 proves that, for , the utility of a skilled worker is always a strictly increasing function of , which allows to complete the drawing of the figures and ends our proof.
Remark 4: Except for the situation of figure 1, where obviously so that i.e. a majority prefers free trade to autarky, Proposition 3 says nothing about the relative values of and . Using however in Annex 1 (A2) with and (A6) with given by (23) and given by (29) allows to prove, after a straightforward calculation, that: (30) which corresponds to a result already obtained in Proposition 2 in FUCHS [1994] .
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
Remark 5: The economic interpretation of the inequalities above can be given in two ways: -for a given (level of unemployment benefit), (the relative price of imported versus local textile) has to be small enough for the positive price effect to be larger than the negative income effect and so for to increase with ; -since the different bounds on can easily be seen to be decreasing in , the larger is the unemployment benefit, the smaller has to be the relative price for to increase with . Remark 6: The main interest of Proposition 3 of course lies in the dynamic policies that it shows to be possible. In the situation of figure 1, the authorities of can choose a succession of quotas leading from 0 FIGURE 3 to (i.e. from autarky to free trade) with at each step a majority assent. In case of figure 2 at the opposite, no progressive opening of the economy will be possible while in figure 3 a majority veto will appear after is reached. In the last two cases though, if (30) is satisfied, a direct jump from 0 to would still appear to be acceptable ! Proposition 3 thus appears as particularly interesting to illustrate the traditional debate between gradualists and adepts of a "bing bang" liberalization.
The common conclusion from Sections 4 and 5 however is that for various reasons -a majority increase in unemployment or a negative income effect more important than the positive price effect -the question of acceptability of free trade is related to complex inequalities relating the parameters of the economy and no a priori general simple policy rule can be given which would guarantee for sure a majority support.
We are thus going to consider in Section 6 a more subtle approach allowing unskilled workers to become, after some time, skilled workers. We shall see that then, a much more simple conclusion can he obtained.
A Dynamic Training Process for Acceptability
Instead of considering only, as up to now, -equilibria with perfect mobility or perfect rigidity in the instant, we shall introduce here a training process defined through the following assumption:
Assumption 5 (training conditions) There exists in a training system allowing unskilled workers to become skilled workers, system with the following two characteristics:
(i) the training period has a definite duration that we shall choose as our unit of time;
(ii) during a training period, at most the fraction ( integer greater than 2) of the unskilled workers can be trained.
From this starting point, we shall now build the following discrete dynamics for : -at time the authorities of allow for the introduction of a quota of textile given by (31) where is a positive integer and is given by (22); clearly corresponds to the autarkic situation;
-at time the skilled active population is given by:
i.e. it is the sum of the skilled active population at time and of the number of unemployed unskilled workers created between and by the increase in the allowed quota, workers who, at time and thanks to (i) of assumption 5 can now occupy a skilled position (this supposes also that (ii) is satisfied; a condition for that will be given later on);
-at time again, the unskilled active population is then defined by equation (17) characterizing -equilibria, i.e. using (31):
(33) -the dynamics is then completely defined with the two initial conditions ; indeed then from (18) and (33) , (34) with so that the double recurrence defined by (32) and (33) can unwind in an obviously unique way; -however a last specification will be introduced later on so as to express the natural constraints that (35) In ordinary language, the dynamics can then be described as follows. At time 0 is autarky. At the introduction of a volume of imported textile creates a level of unemployment for unskilled workers. At , unemployed workers of , after training, find a skilled job but new unemployed unskilled workers appear because now a volume of textile is entering into . And so on until the bounds defined by (35) are possibly hit. Now the double recurrence for and can be solved explicitely. A mixture of calculation and intuition indeed gives: (36) (insertion of the into (32) and (33) allows to check (36)). We can then prove (see Annex 2): LEMMA 2: If the level of active unskilled population is a strictly decreasing function of . The condition is sufficient for (ii) in assumption 5 to be satisfied for all . Then at time and at time .
Respect of (35) is now an easy task. Indeed from Lemma 2 it is first sufficient to define by (36) until and then by:
Then, as adding equations (32) for times between 2 and gives:
(which by the way proves that is an inereasing function of if ) we can define by (36) until and then by
The fact that our dynamics is finite and not infinite cannot appear as a surprise: intuitively the fact that for comes from the fact that the authorized quota of textile is then equal to or greater than where local production vanishes (the delay for to adjust to of course comes from the duration of training). Our process in fact converges, after periods of time, to a -equilibrium with full mobility where all unskilled workers have been trained.
To study then the acceptability properties of this dynamics, we shall now calculate the income distribution which, at each , is generated by the pattern of activity above:
-first, there is a (positive from Lemma 2) number of unemployed unskilled workers with, from assumption (3) an income equal to:
The necessary volume of solidarity tax is thus: (40) (the inequality being a consequence of (A11); -the resources of the active workers are then, from assumption 4:
where the total wages are now:
-the resources of the skilled workers are similarly:
Of course, the new income distribution keeps as its sum but is now a rather complex function of . Still we can obtain: PROPOSITION 4: Let assumptions 1 to 5 be satisfied. Suppose . Consider the training dynamics defined by (32), (33), (37) Proof: Again means that we can concentrate on skilled workers. The first remark then is that for (i.e. ), their consumption function remains given by (12), where is now defined by (43) and (40) and where is given by (31).
Let us then consider
The variation in of this function will define the properties of our aggregate preference . Now for , as and is given by (33), coincides with the value of the function considered in the proof of Proposition 3 and in Annex 1. Thus, from Proposition 3, if is large enough for to be smaller then , one has well according to the values of considered in Proposition 4.
Then for higher values of still below , one gets a formula similar to (A2) namely:
The first bracket has no obvious variation with but, using (40) and (A11) and (A14) in Annex 2, one can see that it has as lowest value:
(taking the lowest value of and the highest value of ). On the other hand, first, from (A10) and (A14) again, for large and large enough also, the first bracket goes to a limit which can be made as near from 1 as one wishes; next, a tedious but straightforward calculation shows that, for large enough, the second bracket is a strictly increasing function of (see Annex 2, (A15) and the following discussion). Thus such that:
Then, for (which means ) and remain constant and the results of the second part of Annex 1 apply.
It remains thus to be proven that, if such that . But from (44), this result can always be obtained whatever or is, just by choosing suitably large enough again.
Comments
The model presented in the paper, despite its (relative) simplicity, already allows to single out and clarify some important elements discussed in international trade theory and in current trade negotiations.
Proposition 2 of course is without surprise when it shows that, so long skilled workers with no risk of becoming unemployed are the decisive majority, any opening of the economy, including free trade, is prefered to autarky. But it also shows that, if there is a risk of a majority of unemployed (which supposes of course the existence of some rigidities, here in wages) there appears a limit degree of opening, in the paper in the form of a maximum quota. This quota then can be found out through dynamics of progressive opening or tatonnement, including a sequence of votes.
Proposition 3 sticks further to reality by considering a rule which defines how to share the burden of possible unemployment between active workers. Then, all possible situations appear, even with a majority of skilled workers. According to the characteristics of the situation (in particular the importance of the price gap for textile between North and South) and according to the policy chosen (the level of the unemployment benefit paid by active workers) dynamics of progressive opening or tatonnement can appear to be or not useful to obtain the limit quota; sometimes they are helpful to reach it gradually with majority support, sometimes a big bang change from autarky to free trade would be a better solution. But anyhow, in a large variety of situations, free trade appears not to be acceptable from a majority point of view.
This gives of course all it interest to the final and unambiguous Proposition 4. There it is no more dynamics of tatonnement but real dynamics of training of manpower which are considered. And it thus appears that, in the worst case, if political authorities are able to go through a first period of time without being blocked by the feeling of a majority (of course preferably by using conviction: "let us try once more" than through dictatorship !) then, after a suitably chosen delay, one can obtain in the end both free trade and unanimity support for it.
Without denying of course that our model is far from the complexity of actual economic world, it gives evidence of situations where taking time to achieve structural changes can be of real interest, and in fact can be a necessity to move towards a politically stable free trade situation. This example thus gives an interesting support to those who consider that trade agreements introducing mutually agreed time delays and paths for a progressive opening of economies and liberalization can have some sound theoretical justifications.
ANNEX 1
Study of
For

1
Then demands are given by (12), which can be rewritten using (6) and (7) From the definition (5) of one then has:
If is constant (to , as a function of has the same properties as i.e. is strictly increasing. In case is given by (28) or (29) (case of -equilibria with perfect rigidity), using these formula, (21) and the definition (27) of one has (with ). Then demands are given by (15), i.e. with (8) 
ANNEX 2
The Dynamics of Trained Population Our point of departure in this annex is (36) which implies that is a strictly decreasing function of , and that is sufficient for (ii) in assumption 5 to be satisfied for all . Adding equations (32) for times between 2 and then gives:
which means that is itself a strictly increasing function of . Now using the derivative of identity (A9) for :
one can, after some calculation, give to the two sums of (36) the more compact expression:
DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTABILITY OF FREE TRADE A direct calculation, using (34) again, gives and which finishes the proof of Lemma 2. We are then in position to derive a series of inequalities which will be useful to prove Proposition 4.
First, using (A12) and (A10) one has Then one sees that for odd is increasing with from while for even is decreasing with from , both in the limit going to . Thus, being any odd value Next let us consider One has
As is strictly increasing in and smaller than being any odd value:
Last, let us consider the variation with of the rationing scheme defined by (8), which is now One sees easily that the sign of is the sign of:
A lengthy but straightforward calculation, using (A10), (A13) and (34) then leads to:
The first term of the sum is positive. The second term is obviously positive for even. For odd, forgetting about , it is proportional to:
As the logarithm is negative so that the function has a maximum somewhere in . Choosing large enough in (A15) with respect to this maximum then allows to have which means that is strictly increasing in .
